Introduction

The discourse on governance in Nigeria perpetually grapples with critical questions such as the genuine implementation of federalism and the adherence to the principles of fiscal federalism. One of the persistent issues is the allocation of public finances to local governments, which is often hindered by corruption at both state and federal levels, thereby obstructing grassroots development.

This article provides an analysis of the constitutional distribution of public funds among the tiers of government and examines the current stance of the Supreme Court on Local Government fiscal autonomy in Nigeria. Through this examination, the article aims to elucidate the challenges and implications of fiscal practices on local governance and development in Nigeria

RECENT SUPREME COURT’S DECISION OF A.G FEDERATION V A.G ABIA STATE & ANOR ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTONOMY

In Attorney General of the Federation v. Attorney General of Abia State & 35 ors (unreported, in suit no: SC/CV/343/2024), the Attorney–General of Federation in invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme court filed a suit against the State Governments seeking to strengthen the autonomy of the Local Government. The Plaintiff commenced the action with an originating summons, raising 15 issues for determination as follows:

1. Whether by the combined reading of sections 1(1), (2) and (3), 4(7), 5(2)(a) and (b) and 3(c), 7(1) and (3) and 14(1), (2)(a), (c) and (4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the 36 states of Nigeria or anyone of them, acting through their/its respective state governors and or state house of assembly, are/is not
under obligation to ensure democratic governance at the third tier of government in Nigeria, namely, at the local government level?

2. Whether by the combined reading of sections 1(1), (2) and (3), 4(7), 5 (2)(a) and (b) and 3(c), 7 (1) and (3) and 14(1), (2)(a), ( c) and (4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the 36 states of Nigeria, or anyone of them, acting through their/its respective state governors and or state house of assembly, can, using state power derivable from law enacted by the state houses of assembly (anyhow so called) or executive orders/other actions (anyhow so called) lawfully dissolve democratically elected Local Government Councils within the said state/states?

3. Whether by the combined reading of sections 1(1), (2) and (3), 4(7), 5(2)(a) and (b) and 3(c), 7(1) and (3) and 14 (1), (2)(a), (c) and (4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the 36 states of Nigeria or anyone of them, acting through their/its respective state governors and or state house of assembly, the 1st36th defendants, or anyone of them can, using state powers derivable from law enacted by the state house of assembly (anyhow so called) or executive orders/other actions (any how so called), lawfully dissolve democratically elected Local Government Councils within the states and replace them with caretaker committees (anyhow so called)?

4. Whether by the combined reading of sections 1(1), (2) and (3), 4(7), 5(2)(a) and (b) and 3(c), 7(1) and (3) and 14 (1), (2)(a), (c) and (4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the dissolution of democratically elected Local Government Councils by the 36 states of Nigeria, or anyone of them, using state powers derivable from laws enacted by the state houses of assembly (anyhow so called) or executive orders/other actions (anyhow so called), is lawful and constitutional?

5. Whether by the combined reading of sections 1(1), (2) and (3), 4(7), 5(2)(a) and (b) and 3(c), 7(1) and (3) and 14(1), (2)(a), (c) and (4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), who through the instrumentality of either a state law or an administrative directive/order, dissolves or causes the dissolution of democratically elected Local Government Councils of their state has not gravely breached the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended); hence as committed gross misconduct?

6. Whether in the face of violation of the constitution and the unconstitutionality of structure of administration of local government councils other than a democratically elected Local Government Council guaranteed by Section 7 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Federal Government/Federation is obligated in section 162(5) and (6) of the 1999 constitution to pay to the state, funds to the credit of the Local Government, when no democratically elected Local Government guaranteed under constitution vide section 7 of the 1999 constitution, is in place?

7. Whether having regard to the effect of section 7 of the 1999 constitution and section 162(5) and (6) of the 1999 constitution and section 162(5) and (6) of the 1999 constitution, a state which is in breach of section 1(1), (2) and 7 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) is entitled to receive and spend fund meant for the Local Government Council by virtue of section 162(5) and (6) of the 1999 constitution while still in breach of the constitution by not putting councils?

8. Whether, by the combined reading of sections 1(1), (2) and (3), 4(7), (2)(a) and (b) and 3(c), 7(1) and (3) and 14(1), (2)(a), (c) and (4) and 162(3), (5), (6), (7) and (8) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), acting through any of their elected or other/its official that dissolves democratically Local Government Councils within its domain is still entitled to the revenue allocation and operation of a joint account as stipulated in section 162(3), (5), (6), (7), (8) of the said constitution until such a status quo ante bellum?

9. Whether the failure of the defendants or any of them to put in place a democratically elected Local Government system mandatorily provided for in section 7 of the 1999 constitution is not a breach and subversion of sections 1(1), (2) and 7(1) of the constitution as to create an interregnum in the Local Government system and render inoperable section 162(5) of the 1999 constitution regarding allocation of fund standing to the credit of local government in federal account to the state?

10. Whether by the combined reading of sections 1(1), (2) and (3), 4(7), 5(2)(a) and (b) and 3(c), 7(1) and (3) and 14(1), (2)(a), (c) and (4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), any elected or other official of the 36 states of Nigeria (or anyone of them) through the instrumentality of either a state law or an administrative directive/order, dissolves or causes the dissolution of democratically elected Local Government Councils of their/its state is liable to be arraigned during or at the end of his tenure (as the case may be) for criminal offence bordering on breach of the constitution/contempt of court and or breach of any applicable criminal and penal laws?

11. Whether by the combined reading of sections 1(1), (2) and (3), 4(7), (2)(a) and (b) and 3(c), 7(1) and (3) and 14(1), (2)(a), (c), (4) and 162(3), (5), (6), (7) and (8) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the states or anyone of them have/has unbridled and unrestricted discretion to operate the “State Joint Local Government Account” whimsically and to the disadvantage of the democratically elected Local Government Councils within those states, rather than for the greater benefit of those councils, which are the third tier of government in Nigeria?

12. Whether by virtue of section 162(3) and (5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), the amount standing to the credit of the Local Government Council in the Federation account should be distributed to it, and if so whether it can be paid directly to it?

13. Whether by virtue of section 162(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), a State Government is not merely an agent of the Local
Governments in the state to collect the amount standing to the credit of a Local Government in the Federation account and pay directly to the Local Government and as such agent, has no power or right to spend or use any part of it for any purpose?

14. Whether by virtue of section 162(3), (5), and (6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, the amount standing to the credit of a Local Government council in the Federal account and received by a state on its behalf and paid into a state joint government account is liable to be paid directly to each Local Government without delay?

15. Whether a Local Government Council is not entitled to direct payments from the Federation account of the amount standing to its credit in said federal account, where the State Government has persistently refused or failed to pay to it the said amount received by the State Government on its behalf?

This action challenged the arbitrary use of power by the state governors, particularly their unilateral dissolution of democratically elected Local Government Councils and subsequent appointment of caretaker committees. It addresses the withholding of funds designated for local governments, with the primary objective being to safeguard the Federation and reinforce 1 the federal structure of governance. The Supreme Court heard the parties on the 13th of June 2024, and on the 11th of July 2024, in an unanimous judgement of a panel of seven members, ruled in favour of the Attorney General of the Federation. In determining issues 1- 4 the court considered the provision of section 7(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) which provides that: “The system of local government by democratically elected Local Government Councils is under this Constitution guaranteed; and accordingly, the Government of every State shall, subject to section 8 of this Constitution, ensure their existence under
a Law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such councils.”

In its interpretation of the above provision, the Supreme Court unequivocally held that governance of Local Governments must be conducted by democratically elected local government councils, rendering any deviation from this mandate impermissible. Consequently, local governments cannot be administered by the Federal government, state governors, caretaker committees, interim Local Government Councils, or similar entities; any such arrangement is unconstitutional. The Court further examined Section 1 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), which stipulates that no person or group shall assume control of the government or any part thereof except as provided by the Constitution. Therefore, any act resulting in or amounting to the substitution of governance at any level constitutes a breach of the Constitution.

In addressing subsequent issues, the Court meticulously interpreted the provision of Section 162 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). Central to its deliberation was the question: “Can the Federal Government validly make direct payments to Local Government Councils from the amounts standing to the credit of the Local Governments in the Federation Account?”.

Honourable Justice Agim (JSC) considered 162 (3) of the constitution which provides that: “Any amount standing to the credit of the Federation Account shall be distributed among the Federal and State Governments and the Local Government Councils in each State on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.” The court noted that from the provision of this subsection that it is clear that the constitution did not intend a joint ownership of the amount but rather a clear distribution, allotting to each tier that which is owed therefore separate ownership.

Thereafter, the court sought to answer the question: “whether the constitution intended that the amount in the Federation Account, standing credit to the Local Government Councils should not be paid to the Local Government Councils but retained and used by the State Governments for the benefits of the Local Government Councils?” In determining this issue, the court carefully analyzed the provisions of section 162 (5) &(6) which provide that 5- “The amount standing to the credit of Local Government Councils in the Federation Account shall also be allocated to the States for the benefit of their Local Government Councils on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.”

1 Emmanual Agbo ’UPDATED: Supreme Court affirms local governments’ financial autonomy, declares caretaker committees illegal’ (Premium Times, 11 July 2024) accessed 15th July 2024

6- ‘Each State shall maintain a special account to be called “the State Joint Local Government Account” into which shall be paid all allocations to the Local Government Councils of the State from the Federation Account and from the Government of the State.’ The court in interpreting sub-section 5 stated, that it is merely a procedure for disbursement
and does not confer on State Governments the discretion on how to manage, expend or disburse the money for the benefit of the Local Government, retention by the State
Government could not have been the intendment of the constitution, noting that for over two decades, the State Governments have persistently refused to pay the Local Governments. The adoption of this procedure was merely to promote effectiveness as against the procedure that was employed prior to the 1999 constitution.

Historically, officials of the 774 Local Government Councils will travel monthly to the Federal Capital Territory to collect the amount standing to their credit in the Federation Account, given the huge logistics and cost issues, a better practice was sought to be implemented under the 1999 constitution which is to pay the amount into the State Joint Local Government account and thereafter be paid to the Local Government Councils, the State Government acting as mere agents. Hence, the states’s retention and usage of Local Governments funds on their behalf does not fit into the tenor and scheme of the provision of section 162 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended)

Hence, the court held that it is illegal and unconstitutional for governors to receive and withhold funds allocated to Local Government Coucils, it is the position of the Supreme Court that Local Government Councils can now directly receive their allocations from the Federation 2 Account , that the states’s retention and use of the money standing to the credit of the Local Government from the federation account for the benefit of the Local Government Councils is unconstitutional.

The court in arriving at the above decision, adopted the purposive or teleological canon of interpretation which demands a benevolent, broad, and liberal interpretation to ensure that the interpretation of the provisions are in tandem with the fundamental values that underline our democratic society and the constitution itself.

In Marwa v Nyako (2012) 6 NWLR (pt.1296) 199, the supreme court per….. held as follows “when interpreting the provisions of our constitution not only should the court look at the constitution as a whole, the provisions should be construed in such a way to justify the hope and aspirations of those who made strenuous efforts to provide us with a constitution to ensure good governance, but also to protect the rights of Nigerians who are the beneficiaries of the provisions
of the constitution, particularly to ensure durable democratic institutions.”

Relying on this rationale, the court interpreted the use of the word “shall” in section 162(5) & (6) as permissive and discretionary and not a mandatory duty. The effect being that State governments no longer serve as an intermediary between the Federal and Local governments with regard to allocations from the Federation Account.

In summary, the supreme court granted the following reliefs:

1. A declaration that all states through their respective state governors and house of assemblies are obligated to ensure democratic governance at the local level of government and as such use state powers to dissolve democratically-elected local government councils and replace them with caretaker committees (or any such variation) is unconstitutional.

2. A declaration that any elected or other official of all the 36 states who through the instrumentality of either a state law or an administrative order dissolve or cause the dissolution of any democratically elected Local Government Council is in grave breach of the constitution and has committed a gross misconduct.

3. A declaration that the current practice of State Governments of keeping, controlling the disbursement of Local Government allocations from the Federation Account is unconstitutional.

This landmark decision establishes a direct link between the Federal and Local governments, reinforcing the principles of federalism upon which the country Nigeria is founded, and this author commends the judiciary for this progressive decision.

FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA

Upon gaining independence, the nation Nigeria has undergone various forms of governance.Initially operating under a parliamentary system, the country subsequently experienced military rule on two occasions and brief period of a presidential system. Ultimately, in 1999 Nigeria established a federal/presidential system of government, which has persisted to the present day. This contemporary governance structure operates through three tiers: Federal, State, and Local, as delineated in Section 3 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of 3 Nigeria, the Federation comprises of 36 states and 774 Local Government Councils. Section 7 of the constitution stipulates that the Local Government system must encompass democratically elected Local Government Councils and the State Governments bear the responsibility of ensuring the existence of legislation that provides for the establishment, structure, composition, financing, and functions of these councils. The constitution further empowers Local Government Councils to engage in the economic planning and development 4 of their respective areas .

To this end, an economic planning board is to be established by a law enacted by the State’s House of Assembly and the Fourth Schedule to the constitution comprehensively outlines the 5 functions of Local Government Councils.

In executing these functions, the Councils require funding, which is financed from two major sources namely;

1. Internally generated revenue (IGR) such as the collection of fines for violation of Local government byelaws, fees, taxes, charges, etc. on items listed in the fourth schedule of 6 the constitution
.
2. Externally generated revenue which includes funds generated outside the local government area such as statutory allocations from the federation account, grants 7 etc.

The process of collection and utilisation of revenue by the Local Government particularly allocations from the Federation account have been a subject of great concern as State
Governments historically and even to the present day restrict the flow of revenue to the grassroots by withholding and taking the required funds.

In 2018, former President Olusegun Obasanjo lamented that the current democratic governments have undermined the objectives of the Local Government reforms introduced in He asserted that;

“When in 1976 we brought in local government reforms, it was meant to be the third tier of the government and not meant to be subjected to whims and caprices of any other
government, just the same way that the state governments are autonomous from the federal 8 government. ”

“Local government is meant to be autonomous from the State Government. But from what we know, by design, most states have incapacitated the Local Governments. They have virtually stolen the Local Governments’ money in what they called Joint Account. They are to contribute 10 percent, but they never contribute anything. So, what we have across the country are Local Government Areas that have functions but cannot perform the functions. They have staff but most of them cannot pay the staff and we keep getting excuses upon 9 excuses. ”

It is disheartening that, after many years, these issues continue to persist, prompting the Supreme Court to render a progressive decision concerning the fiscal autonomy of Local
Governments across the Federation.

FISCAL FEDERALISM UNDER THE 1999 CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

Fiscal federalism is simply described as the financial distribution dynamics between the tiers of government in a Federation, it is the decentralisation of public finance and division of taxing 10 powers and revenue allocation among the constituent units.

In line with the principle of fiscal fedralism, revenue collected by the government of the Federation are deposited into a special account labelled ‘the Federation Account’, maintained by the Federation. Constitutionally, the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal commission is the body responsible for the disbursement and monitoring of public revenue deposited into the Federation Account, which is made up of all revenue generated by the Government of the Federation except proceeds from the personal income tax of personnel of the armed forces of the Federation, the Nigeria Police Force, the Ministry or Department of government charged with responsibility for Foreign Affairs and the residents of the Federal 11 Capital Territory, Abuja.

Hence, every month the representatives of the Federal and State Government hold a Federation Account Allocation Committee meeting which is chaired by the Minister of Finance, Budget and National Planning, to disburse monthly generated revenue among the tiers of government in line with the allocation formula determined by the Revenue Mobilization 12 Allocation and Fiscal Commission and approved by the National Assembly.

In determining the distribution among States of the Federation, factors such as equality of states, population, internal revenue generation, land mass, and terrain as well as the principle 13 of derivation are considered . Therefore, with consideration of these factors, the current 14 allocation formula implemented is ;

Federal Government – 52.68%
State Government – 26.72%
Local Government– 20.60%

To facilitate distribution of funds in the Federation Account, section 162(5) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) provides that:

‘The amount standing to the credit of Local Government Councils in the Federation Account shall also be allocated to the State for the benefit of their Local Government Councils on such terms and in such 15 manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly’

Sub-section 6 further provides that: ‘Each State shall maintain a special account to be called “State Joint Local Government Account” into which shall be paid all allocations to the Local Government 16 Councils of the State from the Federation Account and from the Government of the State.’

Thus, the Constitution unequivocally mandates that State Governments disburse to Local Governments the funds owed to them, and further, make additional contributions from the individual state revenues. In addition to the allocations from the Federation Account, the Revenue Act of 1981 requires that state governments allocate 10% of their internally generated revenue to Local Government Councils on a quarterly basis. Regrettably, State Governments have consistently failed to comply with this statutory obligation.

From the foregoing, it is clear that Local Government Councils despite being the tier of government at the grassroot level are dependent on the state for sustenance to carry out key and basic demands of the Nigerian citizenry. Although Local Governments generate revenue internally, IGR proves insufficient and by implication the provision of services and development of projects within their communities is threatened.

Local Government councils in Nigeria are persistently subordinate to State Governments, suffering from severe fiscal emasculation imposed by state authorities. This subordination forces Local Government chairmen to ingratiate themselves with state governors to secure the necessary funds and support, perpetuating the pernicious culture of godfatherism in Nigerian politics. Such dependency undermines the autonomy of Local Governments and stifles democratic processes, as local leaders prioritise loyalty to state executives over their constituencies’ needs.

Furthermore, the concentration of fiscal power at the state level creates ample opportunities for the embezzlement of public funds earmarked for developmental projects. This
centralization fosters corrupt practices and serves as a significant impediment to societal progress and effective governance at the grassroots level. The diversion of funds from their intended purposes not only hinders infrastructure development and service delivery but also erodes public trust in government institutions.

In the last election, ‘Abba Kabir’ the current governor of Kano state cautioned Local Government Council officials from siphoning funds allocated to grassroots developmental
17 projects to finance the forthcoming elections . In support of this assertion, it has been reported that funds allocated to Local Governments are frequently misappropriated by council officials, 18 often in collusion with state governors, for personal purposes.

The Fourth Schedule of the Constitution delineates the functions of Local Government, which encompass the provision of primary, adult, and vocational education; the development of agriculture and natural resources; and the provision and maintenance of health services, among others. Despite these mandates, Nigeria’s performance in key developmental indicators remains troubling. In 2021, Nigeria ranked 161st out of 181 countries in youth 19 education and employment, reflecting high illiteracy rates . Furthermore, Nigeria’s position on the Global Hunger Index is 109th out of 125 countries, with a score of 28.3, indicating a 20 serious level of hunger . These statistics underscore the urgent need for robust grassroots development initiatives.

To address these systemic issues, there is an urgent need for comprehensive constitutional reforms. These reforms should aim to decentralise fiscal authority, ensuring that local governments have direct access to and control over their financial resources. This shift would empower local councils to undertake development projects independently, promoting transparency and accountability. Additionally, constitutional amendments should include robust mechanisms for monitoring and auditing local government finances to prevent corruption and misuse of funds.

Ultimately, these reforms would dismantle the entrenched culture of godfatherism, enhance Local Government autonomy, and foster a more equitable and efficient system of
governance. By redistributing fiscal power and establishing stringent oversight, Nigeria can create a more resilient framework for local governance that prioritises the welfare and development of its citizens at the grassroots level.

COMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO MAINTAIN LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTONOMY

The recent landmark decision by the Supreme Court has elicited a spectrum of responses, both favourable and critical. Central to the debate is whether this ruling will serve to eradicate corruption at the grassroots level or inadvertently exacerbate it. The rationale behind the mixed reactions lies in the persistent manipulation of constitutional provisions by state governors, who exploit the Joint State Local Government Account to dominate Local Government finances and manipulate local elections to install compliant officials, stifling growth and development. Considering this new era of Local Government autonomy, the following recommendations are proposed to ensure an effective fiscal policy at the local level:

1. Budgeting and Budgetary Control: This involves planning of Local Government expenditures and revenues for a fiscal period to ensure resources are allocated efficiently and used effectively. The process includes preparation of budget proposals by departments, review and approval by relevant authorities, and execution and monitoring to ensure compliance. The main goals are resource allocation, financial planning, expenditure control, coordination among departments, and accountability of public officials.

The other arm being Budgetary Control which refers to the implementation of mechanisms that monitor and regulate government spending to ensure adherence to the approved budget. It includes setting expenditure standards, regular monitoring, reporting, analysis of variances, and making necessary adjustments. This process ensures financial discipline, promotes transparency, prioritizes spending based on strategic goals, and enhances the efficiency and effectiveness of public services, contributing to overall economic stability and good governance in respective Local Government areas.
2. Statutory Residency Requirement for Local Government Chairmen: Local government chairmen should be statutorily mandated to reside within their respective local government areas. This requirement ensures they remain directly engaged with the realities of their constituency, thereby making them immediate witnesses to and recipients of the consequences of any administrative inadequacies.
3 .Independence of electoral institutions at the local tier government. Currently, Nigeria operates a dual electoral commission system, where two distinct electoral bodies are responsible for conducting elections at different levels of government. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) oversees elections at the federal and state levels, while the State Independent Electoral Commission conducts elections at the local government level, in accordance with Section 3, Part II of the Third Schedule of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). Consequently, each state is mandated to establish an independent body tasked with conducting local elections.
However, this arrangement presents several challenges, particularly concerning the composition of these commissions. According to Section 198 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), the chairman and members of the State Independent Electoral Commissions are appointed by the state governor, subject to confirmation by the State House of Assembly. This process undermines the independence of these commissions, as historically, ruling state governments have exploited their influence over the commissions to install loyalists in power and also as officials in the Local Government Councils.

To address this issue, it is imperative to implement measures that remove the State Independent Electoral Commissions from the political control of State Governments. Transferring the power of appointment to the Independent National Electoral Commission could enhance the impartiality and integrity of local elections, thereby increasing the likelihood of free and fair electoral processes at the local level and re-enforcing autonomy.
4. Imperative for Constitutional Amendments to Uphold Local Government: There is an urgent need for constitutional amendments to reflect the new era of Local Government autonomy. Currently, the constitution fails to provide Local Governments with direct access to federal allocations, instead assigning the power of collection and disbursement to State Governments. This arrangement has effectively reduced Local Governments to subsidiaries of the state, stifling their financial independence and operational effectiveness. Consequently, Local Government Councils are unable to access necessary resources directly, limiting their ability to respond to the needs of their constituencies and fostering an environment ripe for misappropriation and corruption.

To rectify these challenges, constitutional reforms must establish a direct and unambiguous pathway for local governments to receive federal allocations independently. Such
amendments should clearly delineate the financial autonomy of local governments, enabling them to plan and execute development projects more effectively. Additionally, incorporating stringent oversight and accountability mechanisms will ensure that federal funds are used transparently and for their intended purposes. This would not only enhance local governance but also contribute to a more decentralized and efficient government structure, ultimately benefiting the entire nation.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, considering Nigeria’s current sensitive political climate, economic challenges, and the incessant demand for socio-economic advancements, it is paramount for the Federal Government to prioritise effective governance at the grassroots level. Local Governments, serving as the initial point of contact between the state and its citizens, are instrumental in addressing the immediate needs and concerns of the populace. To this end, it is essential that Local Governments are equipped with the necessary financial resources to undertake projects that deliver prompt and tangible benefits to the citizenry. By ensuring that Local Government Councils have adequate funding and autonomy, the government can facilitate the implementation of development initiatives that directly impact and improve the quality of life for residents.

This strategic focus on grassroots governance will not only foster greater public trust and engagement but also catalyse broader socio-economic development across the nation.
Furthermore, empowering Local Governments through financial autonomy and direct access to federal allocations will enable them to respond more swiftly and effectively to local needs. This approach will enhance their capacity to deliver essential services, such as healthcare, education, infrastructure, and social welfare, thereby contributing to the overall stability and prosperity of the country.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
STATUTE
The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
The Revenue Act 1981

CASELAW
Attorney General of the Federation v. Attorney General of Abia State & 35 ors (Unreported
delivered on 11th of July 2024, suit no: SC/CV/343/2024).
Marwa v Nyako (2012) 6 NWLR (pt.1296) 199 SC

JOURNALS
Agba, Michael Sunday et al, ‘Local Government Finance in Nigeria: Challenges and
Prognosis for Action in a Democratic Era (1999-2013)’ (2014) Journal of Good Governance
and Sustainable Development in Africa.

Chika Amanze – Nwachuku ’Nigeria: Gov, council official Sipon LG funds’ (All africa, 1st
October 2007) < https://allafrica.com/stories/200710011181.html> accessed 15th

July,2024. Dimeji Kayode-Adedeji, ‘Obasanjo berates state governors, lawmakers opposed to local govt autonomy’ (Premium Times, 12 November 2018) accessed 15th July 2024

Emmanual Agbo ’UPDATED: Supreme Court affirms local governments’ financial autonomy, de c lar e s car e tak e r commi t t e e s i l l egal ’ (Pr emi um T ime s,11 J u l y 2024) accessed 15th July 2024 Faruk, Abubakar & Sanu, kasimu, ‘Evaluation of Internally Generated Revenue Efforts of Giwa Local Government Area of Kaduna State, Nigeria (2009-2013)’ (2016)

Khaleel Muhammad “Kano: don’t be used to siphon funds-Gov-elect, Kabir warns LG chairmen. (Daily post, 7th April 2023) accessed 15th July 2024

Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
<https://neiti.gov.ng/revenue-allocation#:~:text=The%20formula%20allocates%2052.68%25%2C%2026.72,%2C%20I GR%2C%20and%20social%20development.> accessed 15th July 2024